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     ABSTRACT 
 
 
We develop a simple theoretical model with a stochastic demand framework that captures 
the trade-off between inventories and trade credit. The essence is that the firm is in the 
middle of a credit chain, and produces goods for sale, holding inventories of goods that 
were produced but unsold at a cost. In the face of uncertain demand for its products the 
firm extends trade credit to its financially constrained customers to obtain additional 
sales. Our model provides directly testable predictions to identify the response of 
accounts payable and accounts receivable to changes in the cost of inventories, 
profitability, risk and liquidity, and importantly, this influence operates through a 
production channel. Our results support the model and complement many existing studies 
focused on explaining the financial terms of trade credit. 
 
 
 
 
JEL classification: G31, G32 
 
Keywords: Trade Credit, Inventories 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Acknowledgements: We acknowledge beneficial comments from participants at the 
research day organised by the Centre for Finance and Credit Markets, University of 
Nottingham, September 2007. Any remaining errors are our own. 
1 Introduction
It is common in economics to assume that producers dissociate decisions to
manufacture goods from the nancial arrangements that purchasers under-
take to pay for them. It matters little to the producer whether the purchaser
buys the goods with cash or resources that are borrowed, provided credit
has been pre-arranged. But here trade credit is exceptional since the pro-
ducer is both the manufacturer of the goods for sale and the creditor to
the buyer, setting the terms of credit. Trade credit bundles together these
two types of transactions in the mind of the producer since the decision to
o¤er credit facilitates the sale (in the absence of a cash buyer) of the goods
produced, and it is remarkably common for producers to encourage sales
and for purchasers to obtain goods through trade credit.1
Economic research on trade credit has focused mainly on the nancial
side of trade credit. Theoretical papers ask what is the advantage of obtain-
ing credit directly from sellers compared to other (often cheaper) forms of
credit such as bank loans. The literature provides explanations for uptake
or o¤er of trade credit based on informational asymmetries (Smith, 1987,
and Biais and Gollier, 1997), discrimination arguments (Brennan, Maksi-
movic and Zechner, 1988), monitoring advantages (Jain, 2000 and Mateut,
Bougheas and Mizen, 2006), insurance (Cunat, 2007), product quality (Lee
and Stove, 1993 and Long, Malitz and Ravid, 1994) bankruptcy (Frank
and Maksimovic, 2004 and Wilner, 2000) opportunistic behavior (Burkart
and Ellingsen, 2004) and externalities (Daripa and Nilsen, 2005). Empiri-
cal studies explore the relationships between accounts payable and accounts
receivable and other balance sheet variables to corroborate or refute these
theories and examine in detail the terms and conditions of trade credit.2
Operations research has recognized the link between trade credit and
inventories but with an interest in inventory management per se.3 While the
inventory literature acknowledges the interaction between trade credit and
inventories for optimal control, it is less interested in the economic question
of how a rm might consider trade-o¤s between greater overall sales and
1For example, Rajan and Zingales (1995) document that the volume of trade credit in
aggregate was a signicant part (17.8%) of total assets for all American rms in 1991. In
Germany, France and Italy, trade credit represents more than a quarter of total corporate
assets, while in the United Kingdom 70 per cent of total short term debt (credit extended)
and 55 per cent of total credit received by rms is made up of trade credit (Kohler, Britton
and Yates, 2000).
2See for example, Mian and Smith (1992), Rajan and Zingales (1995), Petersen and
Rajan (1997), Ng, Smith and Smith (1999), Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (2002),
Alphonse, Ducret and Severin (2003), Fisman and Love (2003), Giannetti (2003), Preve
(2003), Burkart, Ellingsen and Giannetti (2005), Cunningham (2004) and Love, Preve and
Sarria-Allende (2005).
3See Dobb and Silver (2006) who provide an extensive review of the literature that
explores the advantages of alternative inventory control methods subject to the availability
of trade credit.
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lower inventory costs versus lower liquidity. In this paper, we take a closer
look at these trade-o¤s by proposing a theory and o¤ering some evidence.
We develop a simple theoretical model with a stochastic demand frame-
work that captures the trade-o¤ between inventories and trade credit. The
essential elements are that rms produce goods for sale, hold inventories of
goods that were produced but unsold at a cost, and, critically, o¤er and re-
ceive trade credit in the middle of a credit chain. Sellers facing an uncertain
demand for their products prefer to extend trade credit to their nancially
constrained customers rather than accumulate costly inventories of nished
goods. If it were not for the need to obtain liquidity to meet their own
obligations, producers might readily o¤er trade credit on appropriate terms
to enhance cash sales and boost demand, but the need for liquidity acts as
a constraint. This trade-o¤ has not been fully explored in the economics
literature.4 Our model provides directly testable predictions to identify the
response of accounts payable and accounts receivable to changes in the cost
of inventories, protability, risk and liquidity, which operate by inuencing
production. Even the inuence of bank loans on trade credit operates by
allowing greater production, inventories and sales, nanced in part through
credit. We directly test the predictions of our model using GMM estimates in
rst di¤erences on an unbalanced panel of UK rms drawn from FAME that
includes larger FTSE-quoted rms and those on the smaller AIM/OFEX ex-
change, as well as unquoted rms5.
We view the proposed inventory channel as complementary to the -
nancial theories of trade credit. For example if we consider the two well
cited theories of trade credit by Biais and Gollier (1997) on signalling and
Burkart and Ellingsen (2004) on diversion, we nd that both focus on the
relationship between trade credit and bank loans but neither one explicitly
analyzes the role of inventories. In contrast, while the more recent theory
by Daripa and Nilsen (2005) considers the relationship between inventories
and trade credit, its main aim is to explain trade credit contracts. Here sup-
pliers o¤er trade credit as an incentive to buyers to hold higher inventories -
shifting inventories from seller to buyer. The underlying rationale for trade
credit has some similarities with ours when we consider a rm that lies in
the middle of a credit chain, since suppliers reduce inventories by o¤ering
trade credit and rms that accept trade credit from their suppliers and thus
increase their inventories are also in the position to o¤er trade credit to their
4Some early work on trade credit following a transactions costs approach has analyzed
the trade-o¤s between the costs of nancial transactions and the costs related to the
exchange of goods (see, for example, Nadiri (1969), Schwartz (1974), Ferris (1981) and
Emery (1987)). Only Emery (1987) considers explicitly the trade-o¤ between trade credit
and inventories but does so within a deterministic variable demand framework. Recently,
Daripa and Nilsen (2005) have theoretically examined how this trade-o¤ inuences the
terms of trade credit agreements.
5The actual source is the FAME database collected by Bureau van Dijk Electronic
Publishing and it is available at http://fame.bvdep.com.
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own customers. In fact, the predictions of their model with respect to the
e¤ects of changes in inventories and prot margins on the levels of trade
credit are the same as ours.
In the following section we develop a simple model that captures the
trade-o¤ between trade credit and inventory under stochastic demand. In
section 3, we present our empirical work and in the nal section we conclude.
2 Inventories and Trade Credit
Consider the following 2-period snapshot in the life of a single-product rm
that belongs in a competitive industry and lies in the middle of a trade
credit chain. In period 1, when the rm decides its level of production it
faces uncertainty about the price for its product. The uncertainty can be
related to both rm-specic shocks and market instability. Let  denote
the state of the world in period 2 and () the corresponding price, where
0()  0. Furthermore, let ^ denote its level of production in period 1 and
 (· ^) denote sales in period 2.6 Given that potential buyers are nancially
constrained in period 2 the rm faces the following trade-o¤. It can avoid
holding costly inventories by extending trade credit to its customers, but
trade credit is itself costly as the rm foregoes cash with which to repay its
own creditors. By o¤ering goods on credit the rm is trading-o¤ potential
future cash sales opportunities. We also assume that on average inventories
are sold on discount. The following maximization program captures this
trade-o¤ and solves for the optimal level of sales in period 2.
max

©
() + (^ ¡ ) ¡ (^ ¡  ) ¡ (() ¡ ())
ª
The rst term represents sales in period 2 (both on cash and on trade credit)
while the second term captures future revenues from the sale of inventories,
where  denotes the expected future price. (¢ ¢) represents the holding
cost of inventories, ^ ¡ , and  is a shift parameter that captures other
factors that inuence the cost of inventories. The nal term (¢) captures
the cost of extending trade credit (accounts receivable) that depends on the
amount of trade credit extended, which in turn is equal to sales minus cash
receipts (assumed here to be directly related to the level of liquidity, ).7
We impose the following restrictions on these functions: 1  0, 11  0,
2  0, 12  0, 1  0  0, 00  0 and 0  0. Thus, we assume
that inventory costs are convex in the level of inventories and that the shift
parameter represents a rm characteristic that is associated with higher
inventory costs. We further assume that costs related to extending trade
6 In a multi-period model sales would be restricted by the sum of production and past
inventories. For our purposes, setting past inventories equal to zero is inconsequential.
7Accounts receivable, dened as sales minus cash receipts is directly observable in the
data.
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credit (cost of receivables) are increasing at an increasing rate with the level
of trade credit reecting costs related to lack of cash (higher demand for
expensive accounts payable) and higher expected bankruptcy costs. Finally,
rms that target a higher liquidity will be less willing to o¤er trade credit.
The f.o.c. of the above program is
() ¡  + 1 ¡ ()0 = 0 (1)
that implicitly provides a solution for desired sales as a function of the state
of the world, (). Actual sales are restricted by production, thus optimal
sales, ¤, are given by

() · ^
()  ^

¤ = ()
¤ = ^
(2)
The implicit function theorem implies that


=
0()(1 ¡ 0 ¡ 00())
11 + (())200
(3)
where the second-order condition for a maximum implies that the denom-
inator is positive. Whether sales increase with the state of demand would
depend on the cost of extending trade credit. As long as the corresponding
function is not too convex (11 is low) an increase in the state of demand
would imply higher sales.8 From now on we assume the more plausible case

  0. Then, together, (2) and (3) imply that there exists a state of the
world ^ such that ^ = (^). In low demand states,   ^, the rm sells less
than its output and thus inventories increase while in high demand states,
  ^, the rm o¤ers su¢cient trade credit so that its entire output is sold.
Next, we solve for the optimal level of output in period 1. Let  denote
the constant marginal cost. The rm uses its liquidity, , to pay part of its
cost of production, ^, and to cover the rest it borrows from its suppliers.9 10
In period 1 the rm solves the following program
max
^
Z
^
·
()() + ((^) ¡ ())¡
((^) ¡ () ) ¡ (()() ¡ ())
¸
()+Z
^
h
()(^) ¡ (()(^) ¡ ())
i
()¡ (^) ¡
((^) ¡  ())
8The reason that the sign is ambiguous is because an increase in the state of demand
(higher  which implies a higher ) will boost revenues even if sales stay the same. But
this would imply that the rm would have to o¤er more trade credit. If the cost of the
latter is too high it might decide to lower sales.
9Notice that  denotes both liquidity in period 2 that includes cash receipts and
available liquidity in period 1. This simplication is deemed neccessary because of data
constraints. Trade credit is held on average for periods much shorter than the yearly
frequency of our data. Thus,  captures the average liquidity over a 12-month period.
10Of course, rms have other short-term nancial options that for the moment we ignore
so that we can concentrate on the trade-o¤ between trade credit and inventories.
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where the last term, (¢), captures the cost of holding accounts payable
which are equal to the cost of production, ^, minus cash payments  ()
(where we assume that 0  0; i.e. rms with higher liquidity avoid costly
accounts payable) and (¢) is the density function of the distribution of .
We assume that 0  0 and 00  0 and they capture costs that might be
related to the deterioration of the balance sheet as trade credit expands.
The f.o.c. of the period-1 program isZ
^
[ ¡ 1]()+
Z
^
£
()(1 ¡ 0)¤ ()¡ (1 + 0) = 0 (4)
Higher production increases inventories in low demand states and conse-
quently increases both inventory costs and future revenues (rst term) and
revenues in high demand states (second term). The last term captures the
e¤ect of a marginal increase in output on production and nancing costs.
The above rst-order condition implicitly provides a solution for optimal
output as a function of various exogenous variables.
For our comparative statics below the total derivative of (4), , with
respect to ^, will be useful:
 ´ ¡
·Z
^
11()+
Z
^
(())200()+ 200
¸
^  0
where (1) was used for simplifying the above derivation. The comparative
statics of our model that we are interested in are the e¤ects of changing a
number of exogenous variables on the levels of accounts payable
 ´ (^) ¡  () (5)
and (expected) accounts receivable
 ´
Z
^
()()() +
Z
^
()(^)()¡ () (6)
One useful observation is that a change in ^ will a¤ect both accounts
payable and accounts receivable in the same direction. As production in-
creases, for a given level of liquidity, both trade credit terms go up.
2.1 Cost of Holding Inventories
Inventory costs, such as warehousing and stockout costs, are not directly
observable but the parameter  in the inventory cost function captures rm
characteristics that might be related to these costs. Shirley and Winston
(2004), in their econometric specication of the inventory cost function,
in addition to the level of inventories have included industry and location
dummies to capture variations in these costs due to variations in commodity
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type and geographic location. As Fazel (1997) has argued the size of the
rm might also be important as smaller rms have less exibility in their
choice of purchasing methods.11
From (4), we get
^

=
R
^ 12()

 0
Thus rms that face higher inventory costs at the margin will carry less
accounts receivable and less accounts payable.
Because of its static framework, our model does not distinguish between
stocks and ows. However, our model clearly suggests that any stock of
inventories carried forward will have the same marginal e¤ects as . In this
case we would write the inventory function as (¡1 + ^ ¡  ) where
¡1 denotes lagged inventories. Once more using (4) we get:
^
¡1
=
R
^ 11()

 0
then our model predicts that rms with a higher stock of inventories will
show lower levels of accounts receivable and accounts payable.
2.2 Changes in Protability and Risk
Even rms that operate in the same industry and are of similar size can di¤er
in terms of protability and have di¤erent risk ratings. This could be because
of variations in technologies and organization. One way to capture these
di¤erences in our model is by allowing for changes in the distribution of the
state of the world. A change in the mean keeping the variance the same (so
that the distribution with the higher mean dominates the other in the rst-
order-stochastic-dominance sense) represents changes in protability, while a
change in the variance keeping the mean the same (mean-preserving spreads)
captures changes in riskiness. Once more, it is clear from (4) that the e¤ect of
any change in the distribution on accounts payable and expected accounts
receivable will be through changes in output and that any change in the
distribution will a¤ect accounts payable and expected accounts receivable in
the same direction. Actually, we can show that an increase in protability
will have a positive e¤ect on both accounts and an increase in riskiness can
have either a positive or a negative e¤ect on the two accounts.
Consider rst a change in protability on (4), keeping ^ at its optimal
value before the change. The change subtracts mass from the rst integral
and adds mass on the second integral having an overall positive e¤ect on
the left-hand side of (4). This implies that the optimal value of ^, and thus
11The inventory control argument employed tells us small rms opt more often for
the economic order quantity (EOQ) purchasing option, which requires higher inventories,
because they cannot e¤ectively implement the just-in-time (JIT) alternative.
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output, must be higher, which in turn implies that both accounts payable
and accounts receivable will move up.
Next, consider an increase in riskiness and to ease the exposition suppose
that the initial distribution has support on the interval [1 2]. Again keep-
ing ^ at its optimal value before the change, the increase in dispersion will
have the following e¤ects on (4). It will subtract mass from both integrals
that implies a negative e¤ect on the left-hand side of (4) since the value of
the two integrals together is positive. It will add mass on the left tail of the
rst integral and at the margin this e¤ect will decrease the left-hand side of
(4) while it will also add mass on the right tail of the second integral which
at the margin will increase the left-hand side of (4). Without any further
knowledge of the distribution function we cannot determine the sign of the
overall e¤ect although it seems that both e¤ects will more likely be negative.
2.3 Changes in Liquidity
We have assumed that a rms level of liquidity a¤ects the cost of both
payables and receivables. Here, we consider how changes in liquidity a¤ects
the levels of output and trade credit. Once more using (4) we have
^

=
¡
Z
^
()000()()¡ 000 ()

 0
So an increase in liquidity has a positive e¤ect on production. Then the
e¤ect of a change in liquidity on payables is given by


= 
^
^
^

¡ 0 () ? 0
and on receivables by
[]

=
Z
^
()()
^
^
^

¡ 0() 7 0
These results capture both the indirect e¤ects of higher liquidity on the
two accounts through its inuence on their respective costs and the direct
e¤ects on cash receipts and cash payments. If the direct e¤ects dominate
then higher liquidity will have a negative impact on both accounts.
3 Empirical Methodology and Data Characteris-
tics
To test the predictions of our model we dene our dependent variables AR
and AP to represent accounts receivable (dened as the balance sheet item
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trade debtors) and accounts payable (dened as the balance sheet item trade
creditors). We explain both trade credit extended and trade credit received
with the same independent variables:  , the level of nished goods
and work in process inventories;  measures the likelihood of company
failure in the twelve months following the date of calculation, where a lower
value indicates that the rm is more risky.12 Pr  gives the rms prot
(or loss) for the period,  represents rms gross liquid assets (cash,
bank deposits, and other current assets excluding accounts receivables), and
 represents short-term bank loans.13 With the exception of 
all variables are scaled by total sales.14
We expect the use of trade credit to di¤er from industry to industry
since empirical studies have found wide variations across industries but
rather similar credit terms within industries (Burkart et al., 2005; Ng et
al., 1999; Nilsen, 2002). At the same time, the reliance of rms on internal
nance relative to external nance follows an industry pattern. In addition,
as Shirley and Winston (2004) suggest, inventory costs di¤er signicantly
across industries. This is why we allocate rms to one of the following nine
manufacturing industrial sectors: metals and metal goods; other minerals,
and mineral products; chemicals and man made bres; mechanical engineer-
ing; electrical and instrument engineering; motor vehicles and parts, other
transport equipment; food, drink, and tobacco; textiles, clothing, leather,
and footwear; and others (Blundell et al., 1992). In our specications, we
control for the industry characteristics by including industry dummies in-
teracted with time dummies. Thus the inventory costs can di¤er between
industries, and across time, but not within industries.
In order to check whether the sensitivity of trade credit usage (both
extended and received) di¤ers at rms with di¤erent size, which also a¤ects
the costs of holding inventories (Fazel, 1997), we dene the variable Si 
as the logarithm of rms real assets. We then interact it with the 
variable to control for cost di¤erences in holding inventories. We postulate
that holding costs decrease with the level of inventories but also with the
size of the rm. Therefore, the estimated equations take the following form:
12We are using the quiscore indicator produced by Qui Credit Assessment Ltd, which
measures the likelihood of company failure in the twelve months following the date of
calculation. Quiscore is given as a number in the range from 0 to 100. The lower its
quiscore the more risky a rm is likely to be. This is a wider denition of perceived
nancial health than the commonly used bond rating, which only applies to rated rms
(Whited, 1992; Kashyap and Stein, 1994).
13We include the latter variable in our specications as we think that rms use of trade
credit relies heavily on their use of bank loans even though our theoretical model has
concentrated on trade credit only. We extend the theoretical model to include bank loans
and explain our empirical results in the appendix.
14Exact data denitions are given in the appendix.
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

=  +


1 +


¤ Si 2 +3 +
Pr 

4 +


5 +


6 + Si 7 + 
and


=  +


1 +


¤ Si 2 +3 +
Pr 

4 +


5 +


6 + Si 7 + 
where  is a rm-specic component, s and s are coe¢cient values,
and  and  are the respective idiosyncratic error component. We control
for rm-specic, time-invariant e¤ects, and for the possible endogeneity of
the regressors, by using a rst-di¤erence GMM approach.15 Lags of each of
the regressors (including the interaction terms) are used as instruments.16
Both time dummies and industry dummies interacted with time dummies
are included in all our regressions. We report both the rst- (m1) and
the second-order (m2) test for serial correlation, which are asymptotically
distributed as a standard normal under the null of no serial correlation of
the di¤erenced residuals. At the same time, the variables in the instrument
set should be uncorrelated with the error term in the relevant equation if
the model is correctly specied. We report the Sargan (Hansen) test for the
legitimacy of variables dated t-2 as instruments in the di¤erenced equation.
Under the null of instrument validity the Sargan test for overidentifying
restrictions is asymptotically distributed as a chi-square with degrees of
freedom equal to the number of instruments less the number of parameters.
Our dataset is derived from the prot and loss and balance sheet data
gathered by Bureau Van Dijk Electronic Publishing in the FAME database,
which provides information on companies over a ten year period. Our sample
includes rms operating in the manufacturing sector and covers the period
1993 - 2003. The majority (over ninety-nine percent) of the rms included
in the dataset are not traded on the stock market. The large proportion of
unquoted rms means we are likely to observe many rms that are nan-
cially constrained. Therefore the relevant consideration for these rms is the
opportunity to purchase goods at the margin nanced by additional trade
credit or bank loans. We excluded companies that changed the date of their
accounting year-end by more than a few weeks so that the data refer to 12
15All our regressions are performed in Stata using the command xtabond2 developed
by Roodman (2005).
16This is the reason why the size of the sample in the tables of results is smaller than
the full sample.
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month accounting periods. We excluded observations in the 1 percent tails
for each of the regression variables to control for the potential inuence of
outliers. Table 1 reports summary statistics.
3.1 Empirical Results
Tables 2 and 3 report the relationship between accounts receivable (AR)
and accounts payable (AP) for rms in our panel and their characteristics.
Column 1 in both tables presents regression results ignoring the inuence of
Si  while the remaining columns include Si  as an additional variable
(column 2), as an interaction term with  (column 3) and both as an
additional variable and an interaction term (column 4).
The level of inventories is predicted to have a direct negative a¤ect on
AR, and an indirect negative a¤ect on AP from our model. Here production
decisions are critical, since when production exceeds sales causing invento-
ries to increase, other things equal, rms will have an incentive to o¤er
more trade credit in order to gain more total sales and hold fewer invento-
ries. The argument is similar to the sales motive identied by Wilson and
Summers (2002), where rms extend sales by o¤ering goods on account in
the rst instance. Our results show that inventories have a large, negative
and signicant impact on AR and a negligible impact on AP.
As proposed in the model, there are interactions that inuence the scale
of the impact of inventory holding costs. The most important of these is the
size of the rm, which has an impact on both AR and AP. Larger rms both
extend and receive more trade credit to and from their business partners
(even after scaling by sales) and they also have lower inventory holding
costs within the same industry other things equal. The levels of AR and AP
divided by sales increase with the size of the rm since the additional size
variable is signicant and positive in both regressions (column 2, Tables 2
and 3) and when we interact the  variable with the measure for size
(columns 3 and 4, Tables 2 and 3) it becomes apparent that as the size of the
rm increases, stocks of inventories play a lesser role in the rms decision
to extend AR since the positive coe¢cient of the interacted term o¤sets the
negative e¤ect of stocks on AR (column 3, Table 2). In terms of the trade-
o¤ between avoiding holding costs of inventories and obtaining future cash
sales, the cost of holding stocks is lower for larger rms. As before, AP are
not inuenced by the rms stocks of inventories and our other results do
not change when we drop this variable from the regression (column 4, Table
3).
Risk, protability and liquidity have an indirect inuence on AR and
AP through the level of production and inventories. Our model predicts
protability will increase both AR and AP, but the signs of risk and liquid-
ity are not determined. However, as we remarked earlier we have reasons
to think that our Risk variable might have a negative impact on both AR
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and AP and this is what our empirical results suggest. We have found a
negative relationship between liquidity and trade credit extended, and this
is consistent with Peterson and Rajan (1997), who also found a negative re-
lationship between AR and liquidity. Protability has a positive e¤ect since
extra prot can be channeled towards AR, and trade credit is more likely to
be o¤ered to protable rms. The common sign pattern is supported in our
results and protability is positive in both AR and AP regressions. These
rm-specic characteristics were also found to be important in determining
access to bank loans in Bougheas, Mizen and Yalcin (2006) but our con-
tribution here is to show that besides indirectly inuencing AP by relaxing
credit limits from banks, they have direct e¤ects on AP and AR through
inventories since the rm faces a trade-o¤ between incurring holding costs
of inventories with the possibility of future cash sales versus sales on credit
now.
We introduce the variable  to determine the e¤ect of bank loans
on AR and AP as a control variable. We nd that it increases AR and
reduces AP, which is consistent with the pecking order of nance view,
which assumes that trade credit is more expensive than bank loans. The
idea that trade credit is lower down the pecking order of nance has been
supported by Petersen and Rajan (1997) who nd evidence that US rms
increase AP when credit is rationed i.e. there is restricted access to bank
loans and capital markets. It is also consistent with the assumptions of
Burkart, Ellingsen and Giannetti (2005). We o¤er a theoretical extension
to our model that explains how our ndings can be embedded in our model
in the Appendix, although it is a secondary consideration in relation to the
role of inventories.
To summarize, our theoretical model explains the decision process of
the rm, which derives optimal production and sales subject to the state of
the world. This indicates how AR and AP respond to changes in output
as the state of the world improves, and risk, protability and liquidity as
well as bank loans impinge on this state of the world, a¤ecting production
and inventories, and therefore alter the levels of AP and AR. This is the
inventory channel of trade credit which we conrm empirically.
Our nal analysis involves exploration of the robustness of our results.
We consider rms that are relatively large or small in relation to others
in their industry by dening a dummy variable Large which takes value 1
in a given year if the rms total assets are in the top 25 percentile of the
distribution of the total assets of all the rms in that particular industry and
year. By contrast small rms are in the remainder of the distribution. We
allow rms to transit between categories and we also acknowledge that rm
size is measured specically for each industry. The cut-o¤ value is decided
by the distribution of the rms in our sample reported in Table 1b, where
centile values for real assets are displayed. This underlines the fact that our
dataset mainly comprises small rms.
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In Table 4 we rst investigate the e¤ects of the Large dummy on the level
of AR and AP. We nd that large rms extend more AR and more AP, as
indicated by a positive and signicant coe¢cient (columns 1, 3 and 4, Table
4). Then by interacting the Large and Small = (1-Large) dummies with
 we determine whether inventories play a greater or lesser role on
AR and AP for large and small rms. We nd that rms that are relatively
large compared to other rms in the same industry and year respond less
to inventories than do small rms. This claries the point that relatively
large rms are less inuenced by the trade-o¤ between current credit sales
and future cash sales because their holding costs are lower. These results are
robust to the choice of the cut-o¤ level and are practically identical in terms
of signs, and relative magnitudes, when setting the cut-o¤ value at the 50th
percentile, 70th percentile, and 80th percentile.
The results are qualitatively the same when we reconsider our analysis
using data only for the unquoted rms, as they constitute the majority of
the rms in our sample. Results are also qualitatively the same when we
eliminate from the analysis the larger public rms. Finally, including only
time dummies in the instrument matrix and leaving out industry dummies
interacted with time dummies produces similar results.17
4 Conclusions
We develop a simple theoretical model with a stochastic demand framework
that captures the trade-o¤ between inventories and trade credit. The essen-
tial elements are that the rm is in the middle of a credit chain, and produces
goods for sale, holds inventories of goods that were produced but unsold at
a cost and in the face of uncertain demand for its products extends trade
credit to its nancially constrained customers to obtain additional sales.
Our model provides directly testable predictions to identify the response of
accounts payable and accounts receivable to changes in the cost of invento-
ries, protability, risk and liquidity, and importantly, this inuence operates
through a production channel. Even the inuence of bank loans on trade
credit operates by allowing greater production, inventories and ultimately
sales nanced in part through credit. We directly test the predictions of our
model using GMM estimates in rst di¤erences on an unbalanced panel of
UK rms drawn from FAME that includes larger FTSE-quoted rms and
those on the smaller AIM/OFEX exchange, as well as unquoted rms. Our
results support the model suggesting that there is an inventory channel
of trade credit, complement many existing studies focusing on the nancial
terms of trade credit.
17These results are not reported but are available on request.
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Appendix 1: Introducing Bank Loans
In order to concentrate on the trade-o¤ between trade credit and in-
ventories we ignore any other forms of nance available to rms when we
developed our theoretical model, and we assume with Peterson and Rajan
(1997) and Burkart and Ellingsen (2004) that bank credit is cheaper than
trade credit. We also assume the rm faces a bank credit limit ¹, which
may be related to credit constraints arising from asymmetric information or
any other cause, and we denote by  the amount actually borrowed. Then
under the supposition that bank loans are cheaper than trade credit for a
given maturity we have
 = minf(^) ¡  () ¹g
Thus, the rm exhausts its bank credit limit before it seeks credit from its
suppliers.18 accounts payable now are
 ´ (^) ¡  () ¡ 
For rms that are not nancially constrained,   ¹, increasing the bank
credit limit will not a¤ect any of their decisions. In contrast, for nancially
constrained rms,  = ¹, an increase in the bank credit limit will have the
following e¤ects:
^
¹
=
¡00

 0
Production will increase and thus accounts receivable will also increase. In
contrast, we have

¹
= 
^
^
^
¹
¡ 1
So accounts receivable are complements to bank loans but accounts payable
can be either complements or substitutes.
18To keep things simple we have assumed that the limit is exogenous. Following recent
developments suggest that the credit limit is increasing in tangible assets,  , and decreas-
ing in existing debt, , (Bougheas, Mizen and Yalcin, 2005), increasing in past accounts
receivable as being one of the assets that banks are willing to accept as collateral (Mian
and Smith, 1997 and Burkart and Ellingsen, 2004) and past accounts payable following
Biais and Gollier (1997) and Burkart and Ellingsen (2004) who argue that the willingness
of rms to supply trade credit provides a signal to banks that the borrower is creditworthy.
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Appendix 2: Denitions of the variables used
Accounts receivable: dened as the ratio of the balance sheet item trade
debtors and the rms total sales.
Accounts payable : dened as the ratio of balance sheet item trade cred-
itors and the rms total sales.
Stocks: includes nished goods and work-in-process inventories scaled
by the rms total sales.
Risk : we are using the quiscore indicator produced by Qui Credit Assess-
ment Ltd, which measures the likelihood of company failure in the twelve
months following the date of calculation. Quiscore is given as a number in
the range from 0 to 100. The lower its quiscore the more risky a rm is
likely to be. The indicator is constructed taking into account a number of
factors, including the presence of any adverse documents appearing against
the company on the public le, and the timeliness of getting the accounts
led. However, the most important factors relate to the nancial perfor-
mance of the company as evidenced by its balance sheet and prot and loss
accounts. The key nancial items used include turnover, pre-tax prots,
working capital, intangibles, cash and bank deposits, creditors, bank loans
and overdrafts, current assets, current liabilities, net assets, xed assets,
share capital, reserves and shareholders funds. The underlying economic
conditions are also taken into account.
Prots: gives the rms prot (or loss) for the period scaled by the rms
total sales.
Liquid : represents rms gross liquid assets (cash, bank deposits, and
other current assets excluding accounts receivable)
Banks: represents short-term debt scaled by the rms total sales. Short-
term debt includes the following items: bank overdrafts, short-term group
and director loans, hire purchase, leasing, and other short-term loans, but
it is predominantly bank nance.
Size: is the logarithm of rms total real assets.
Total assets : the sum of the rms xed and current assets.
Deators: total assets are deated using the aggregate GDP deator.
Large: dummy variable which takes value 1 in a given year if the rms
total assets are in the top 25 percentile of the distribution of the total assets
of all the rms in that particular industry and year. By contrast small rms
are in the remainder of the distribution. Thus rms are allowed to transit
between categories.
Quoted: rms are quoted if they are traded either on the stock exchange,
or on the smaller AIM / OFEX exchange. The remainder of the rms are
unquoted. Firms are assumed not to change category during time.
Public: rms traded on any exchange and public rms not traded at all.
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Appendix 
 
Table 1. Summary statistics (mean and standard deviations) 
 
Variable Whole 
sample 
Small 
Bottom 
75% 
Large 
Top 25% 
Small 
Bottom 
50% 
Large 
Top 50% 
Small 
Bottom 
25% 
Large 
Top 75% 
0.171 0.176 0.157 0.176 0.166 0.174 0.171 TD 
(0.078) (0.077) (0.077) (0.078) (0.077) (0.078) (0.077) 
0.107 0.108 0.101 0.109 0.104 0.109 0.106 TC 
(0.062) (0.062) (0.059) (0.063) (0.061) (0.063) (0.061) 
0.121 0.118 0.131 0.112 0.130 0.102 0.128 Stocks 
(0.089) (0.089) (0.088) (0.087) (0.090) (0.082) (0.090) 
0.540 0.535 0.557 0.525 0.556 0.507 0.551 Risk 
(0.214) (0.212) (0.220) (0.209) (0.218) (0.207) (0.215) 
0.031 0.029 0.036 0.028 0.034 0.028 0.032 Profits 
(0.075) (0.071) (0.087) (0.070) (0.080) (0.070) (0.077) 
0.155 0.131 0.225 0.116 0.194 0.100 0.173 Liquid 
(0.203) (0.177) (0.254) (0.160) (0.231) (0.145) (0.216) 
0.152 0.135 0.201 0.125 0.179 0.115 0.164 Banks 
(0.195) (0.168) (0.253) (0.151) (0.228) (0.138) (0.209) 
8.695 8.044 10.654 70.587 90.805 70.074 90.237 Size 
(1.483) (0.892) (1.144) (0.688) (10.210) (0.559) (10.287) 
 Observations 72905 54714 18191 36477 36428 18267 54638 
 
Note: TD represents trade debit (account receivables) and TC represents trade credit (account payables). Stocks 
stands for stocks of inventories; Risk measures the likelihood of company failure in the twelve months following 
the date of calculation, where a lower value indicates that the firm is more risky. Profits gives the firm's profit (or 
loss) for the period; Liquid represents firm's liquid assets (cash, bank deposits, and other current assets), Banks 
represents short-term bank loans. Size is the logarithm of total real assets. With the exception of Risk and Size all 
variables are scaled by total sales. We separate firms into two size categories using a dummy variable for size 
named Large, which takes value 1 in a given year if the firm's total assets are in the top 25 (columns 2-3), top 50 
(columns 4-5), and top 75 (columns 6-7) percentile of the distribution of total assets of all the firms in that 
particular industry and year. Thus firms are allowed to transit between categories.  
 
 
 
Table 1b. Centile values for real assets 
 
Variable Percentile Centile 
Real assets 1 361.753 
 25 2163.765 
 50 4797.402 
 75 13244.19 
 99 515488.6 
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Table 2. Accounts receivables (AR) 
 
 1 2 3 4 
Stocks -0.369*** -0.554*** -1.066** -1.444*** 
 (0.119) (0.146) (0.415) (0.547) 
Stocks*Size   0.085** 0.109* 
   (0.040) (0.061) 
Risk -0.138*** -0.210*** -0.148*** -0.203*** 
 (0.029) (0.037) (0.030) (0.036) 
Profits 0.268*** 0.493*** 0.284*** 0.488*** 
 (0.104) (0.099) (0.100) (0.094) 
Liquid -0.091** -0.071 -0.120*** -0.082* 
 (0.043) (0.051) (0.039) (0.044) 
Banks 0.099*** 0.097** 0.083*** 0.091** 
 (0.033) (0.041) (0.031) (0.037) 
Size  0.030***  0.019 
  (0.009)  (0.013) 
Observations 56432 56432 56432 56432 
No of firms 10877 10877 10877 10877 
m1(p) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
m2(p) 0.19 0.69 0.18 0.71 
Hansen/Sargan (p) 0.24 0.39 0.33 0.44 
 
Notes: All specifications are estimated using a GMM first-difference specification. Test statistics and standard errors (in 
parentheses) are asymptotically robust to heteroskedasticity. m1 (m2) is a test for first- (second-) order serial correlation in the 
first-differenced residuals, asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no serial correlation. The Hansen/Sargan test is 
a test of the overidentifying restrictions, distributed as chi-square under the null of instrument validity. Instruments include 
Stocksi,t-2; Stocksi,t-2*Size i,t-2; Riski,t-2; Profiti,t-2; Liquidityi,t-2; Banksi,t-2; and further lags. Time dummies and time dummies 
interacted with industry dummies were always included as regressors and as instruments. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 
10, 5, and 1 percent level, respectively. 
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Table 3. Accounts payables (AP) 
 
 1 2 3 4 
Stocks -0.038 -0.109 0.035  
 (0.079) (0.092) (0.273)  
Stocks*Size   -0.004  
   (0.026)  
Risk -0.167*** -0.200*** -0.157*** -0.224*** 
 (0.028) (0.035) (0.026) (0.036) 
Profits 0.231*** 0.344*** 0.180*** 0.361*** 
 (0.078) (0.076) (0.069) (0.078) 
Liquid 0.072*** 0.089*** 0.045* 0.079** 
 (0.027) (0.031) (0.023) (0.032) 
Banks -0.109*** -0.116*** -0.104*** -0.167*** 
 (0.033) (0.040) (0.030) (0.045) 
Size  0.016**  0.018*** 
  (0.006)  (0.007) 
Observations 55848 55848 55848 55848 
No of firms 10806 10806 10806 10806 
m1(p) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
m2(p) 0.44 0.19 0.62 0.14 
Hansen/Sargan(p) 0.52 0.60 0.15 0.86 
 
Notes: All specifications are estimated using a GMM first-difference specification. Test statistics and standard errors (in 
parentheses) are asymptotically robust to heteroskedasticity. m1 (m2) is a test for first- (second-) order serial correlation in the 
first-differenced residuals, asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no serial correlation. The Hansen/Sargan test is 
a test of the overidentifying restrictions, distributed as chi-square under the null of instrument validity. Instruments include 
Stocksi,t-2; Stocksi,t-2*Size i,t-2; Riski,t-2; Profiti,t-2; Liquidityi,t-2; Banksi,t-2; and further lags. Time dummies and time dummies 
interacted with industry dummies were always included as regressors and as instruments. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 
10, 5, and 1 percent level, respectively. 
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Table 4. Robustness results  
 
Results for accounts receivables (AR) are presented in columns 1-2 and for accounts payables (AP) in 
columns 3-5. Instead of using the continuous variable Size, we consider the situation of each firm 
relative to that of other firms in the industry in which that firm operates and for each year. We define a 
dummy variable for size named Large, which takes value 1 in a given year if the firm's total assets are in 
the top 25 percentile of the distribution of total assets of all the firms in that particular industry and year. 
This way we allow firms to transit between categories. We then interact Stocks with (1-Large) and Large 
to capture the impact of costs of holding inventories separately for small and large firms.   
 
 AR AP 
 1 2 3 4 5 
Stocks -0.375***  -0.041   
 (0.119)  (0.080)   
Stocks*Small  -0.354***   -0.012 
  (0.124)   (0.083) 
Stocks*Large  -0.226**   -0.064 
  (0.103)   (0.066) 
Risk -0.138*** -0.134*** -0.166*** -0.184*** -0.159*** 
 (0.029) (0.028) (0.028) (0.029) (0.027) 
Profits 0.273*** 0.241** 0.234*** 0.251*** 0.177*** 
 (0.103) (0.096) (0.078) (0.083) (0.069) 
Liquid -0.088** -0.105*** 0.072*** 0.071** 0.056** 
 (0.043) (0.039) (0.027) (0.028) (0.024) 
Banks 0.098*** 0.089*** -0.109*** -0.141*** -0.104*** 
 (0.033) (0.031) (0.033) (0.036) (0.031) 
Large 0.013***  0.006** 0.006**  
 (0.003)  (0.002) (0.003)  
Observations 56432 56432 55848 55848 55848 
No of firms 10877 10877 10806 10806 10806 
m1(p) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
m2(p) 0.22 0.16 0.41 0.38 0.69 
Hansen/Sargan(p) 0.25 0.37 0.54 0.82 0.19 
 
Notes: All specifications are estimated using a GMM first-difference specification. Test statistics and standard errors (in 
parentheses) are asymptotically robust to heteroskedasticity. m1 (m2) is a test for first- (second-) order serial correlation in the 
first-differenced residuals, asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no serial correlation. The Hansen/Sargan test is 
a test of the overidentifying restrictions, distributed as chi-square under the null of instrument validity. Instruments include 
Stocksi,t-2; Stocksi,t-2*Smalli,t-2; Stocksi,t-2*Largei,t-2; Riski,t-2; Profiti,t-2; Liquidityi,t-2; Banksi,t-2; and further lags. Time dummies and 
time dummies interacted with industry dummies were always included as regressors and as instruments. *, **, *** indicate 
significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level, respectively. 
 
